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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DAKlEL R. 1fl~LLEN, I 
Plaintiff and AJJpcllant, 
YS. 
I XDl 'STRIAL C01L\USSION OF 
l-TA!l, lTTAlf RICHARDSON 
HOOFIXG and 'rHI£ STA'l'E 
IX0lTRAl\CJ1~ FPND, 
Dcfcnda11ts and Respondents. 
\ 
~ 
Case No. 
10795 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
STA'l'I~trENT OF FACTS 
Suhs<'qc1ent to the filing of plaintiff's claim with 
tlw Industrial Commission, a hearing was had on this 
matter on November 17, 1965. The plaintiff testified that 
he was the sole owner and proprietor of Utah Richard-
son Roofing and had been in the roofing contracting 
business since 1947. In connection with such occupation 
it<' t('Stifit>d that the job of roofing was extreme physical 
wor 1.;:. (R 2-1:). Prior to the date of the alleged accident 
on ,June 23, 1965, the plaintiff had experienced chest 
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pams which h(' felt \\'<'l't' eitl1e1· µ;as pains or pkurisy. 
(R. 2G). 
On the :2:i1d day of .June, J 9Gj, the applicant was 
working on a flat rnof in Salt Lake County. (R ?iO). 
There \\'a8 nothing ahnormal about tlw particular job 
a8 trstified hy the plaintiff. (R. 32): 
Q. "X ow isn't it a fact on this :23rd day of 
.June, 1965, the \\'Ol'k ;·ou we1·e doing wa8 the 
normal work that you do on a roof? 
A. Yes, sir." 
The plaintiff testified that both on the :?.3rd of .Tum•, 
1965, and prior when he felt the pains in his chest, the 
pains did not necessitate his leaving the job ( R ::33-3-1-), 
and that, in fact, he left the jobsite because he had com-
pleted his work for that day. (R. ::3-± ). In addition to 
the pains that he felt earlier that day, pain was prrsent 
at approximately 3 :00 p.m. when he was not on the roof 
working, but he was rather driving one of his vehicles 
to the shop. (R. 34). The pain that precipitated the call 
for medical attention occurred in the evening at his honw 
when the pain became most seven' and his siieech became 
incoherent. 
Subsequent to this hearing the Industrial Commis-
sion, pursuant to 35-1-77 UCA 1953 as amended, sub-
mitted the medical aspects of the case to a medical panel 
and pursuant to its charge the panel initiated an investi-
gation. The panel report (R. -!G) states, in part, as 
follows: 
'' The contents of the file from the Industrial 
Commission has been revic~wed and extracted, and 
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each of tlw panel meHilwn; singly have reviewed 
the information available. Th<:' patient was exam-
i1wd liy each panel member, and discussion with 
{'Valuation of the situation by the panel as a 
group has been acomplished . . . '' 
1n the medical panel report on file herein, dated 
April 1, 1966 (R. 46) on the first page, the doctors 
reviewed the history of the case immediately prior to 
the occurrence of June 23, 1965. No objection is made 
to this review, however, on pag<-> two of the medical 
pnn<->l report tht>~v state that in examining the patient 
he related an occurrence of June 21, 1965, when, after 
supper, at apprnximately 9 :00 p.m. he had an anginal 
pain that was so seven· that codeine had been taken for 
rC'liPf of the pain. Based upon this fact and upon tht· 
pain experience of June 19, 19G5, the panel found that 
the plaintiff had symptoms directly related to his heart 
disease bdore the date of the alleged accident or injury. 
At n subsequent hearing on the 6th day of July, 
1%(), the plaintiff again testified as to the type of pains 
he had experienced prior to the 23rd day of June, 1965. 
Prior to this tt•stirnony Dr. Kilpatrick, the chairman of 
Uw im·dical panel rPport, h•shfied at this hearing and 
upon cross-examination b~' Mr. Black, related what the 
plaintiff had told him when he was obtaining the plain-
tiff's medical histon·. The Doctor testified (R. 63) in 
1iart, as follows: 
Q. ''\\'hat did he tell you? 
A. . .. '11 hat lw had on the night of the 19th 
of .JunP a severe pain in his chest, and he wasn't 
t•xactly sure what it was. He surmised that it was 
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indigestion, and he had available some codeinP 
tablets that he had on hand from a previous pa.in 
that he had had several yPars lwfore witlt his 
hack, and he took one of the::-;e, and aftn awhile 
his pain subsided and he WPnt on about his usual 
work." 
After the plaintiff had described these prior paim; 
and in effect denied th<c' occunence that he had previ-
ously related to the Doctor on the 19th day of ,June, 
Dr. Kilpatrick was again called in to testify and was 
asked whether or not these factual experiences related 
hy Mr. 1f ellen changed the Doctor's opinion (R 77): 
"1\fr. Moore: I haw• one more question of Dr. 
Kilpatrick, if I may. 
Mr. Moore: Dr. Kilpatrick, is there anything 
:vou have heard today, subsequent testimony, that 
would change your opinions that are contained 
in the Medical Report~ 
Dr. Kilpatrick: No, sir." 
1'herefore, the point made by plaintiff in his Statemmt 
of Facts on page six (G) wherein he stated that "there 
is no substantiation in the record for the alwi;e statement 
as to a severe attack on June 21, 1965," is academic. Dr. 
Kilpatrick explained that the vanel report based its 
factual history upon the plaintiff's statement and there-
fore the statements contained within the said report 
are certainly proper. Notwithstanding this, the Doctor 
clearly concluded that his basic opinion had not been 
changed by Mr. Mellen's subsequent explanation. 
Subsequent to the findings of the nwdical pam•l re-
port referred to above, the plaintiff timely filt'd objee-
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ti on to the n~1Jort ( R. 5:3), \\'hi ch occasioned the hearing 
on .July G, 19G6. rrhe record shows ( R. 67, 68) that the 
111Pdical panel }'(•port was properly adrnHted into evi-
dence based upon proper oral testimony as required by 
35-1-77 UCA 1953 as amended. It should be noted that 
no ohjertion was made to its admission. 
'l'he pant>l report is clear that the opm10n of the 
three physicians appointed was that the applicant's 
heart condition was not due to work activities, but rather, 
tlwy found that the plaintiff had "a natural evolution 
of a degenerative process in his heart, which culminated 
in an attack of pain and apparent collapse on or about 
7 :00 p.rn. while at home on the night of .June 23, 1965." 
BasPcl upon the fads of prior pain "long before the day 
of tlw alk•ged injury," the panel concluded that these 
pains indicated that the plaintiff's present incapacity 
\\·as due to the pre-existing heart disease and was not 
related to hi:,.; work. 
Dr. Charles D. Behrens, the treating physician, 
disagrePd with the medical panel and felt that the work 
rondition8 of the applicant aggravated the heart condi-
tion. Dr. Behrens did agree with the medical panel in 
that the plaintiff had been suffering for a long time with 
a lwart disease. (R. 9-t ). Dr. Behrens admitted in his 
tPstimony that a person suffering from this long stand-
ing- disea:,.;e would not have been required to have any 
particular aetivit:v trigger the condition which resulted 
in the plaintiff's present disability. After Dr. Behrens 
te8tifit•d as to his opinion, Dr. Kilpatrick was again re-
callPcl to tt•stify and was asked whether or not Dr. 
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Behren::;' testimony, including his opm1on, and ba~P<l 
upon the fact that he ,,-as the treating physician, varied 
his testimony. Again, Dr. Kilpatrick stated that his 
opinion had not changed. (R 101). 
The statP of the record is clt>ar that tlwre is a dis-
agreement of medical ovinion. Both physicians who 
testified considert'd que::;tions presentPd to them on 
whether or not the work activities precipitated a pn•-
existing condition and they disagreed with each other. 
Dr. Kilpatrick admitted that a myocordial infarction 
"could have been caused" by the work activities, how-
ever, the record is clear (see medical panel report) that 
it was the panel's opinion that the disability of thf~ 
plaintiff was due to the pre-existing condition which 
was not aggravated by his working activities. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE COMMISSION'S DENIAL OF PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM 
WAS NOT CONTRARY TO THE UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE 
AND WAS NOT ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS. 
It is respectfully submittPd that tht:~ plaintiff ha:s 
created two strawmen in order to sustain his position 
that the Industrial Conunission 's award should be re-
versed. Initially, the plaintiff claims that the Industrial 
Commission and the medical panel made its findings 
based upon the fact that the plaintiff is re(1uired to show 
unusual exertion as a direct cause of thr~ alleged injury. 
Nowhere in the record and, in particular, in the Order 
herein (R. 103) is there any reference to the fact that 
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till' iilaintiH's daim was drnied l>el'ause the plaintiff 
!'ailed to show facts of unusual Pxertion. The statement 
;11 plaintiff's hrid, that tlw medical panel interpreted 
('rroneousl:-,' the law, is without foundation. The medical 
pmwl, in effect, made two findings. One, that prior to 
.J mw 2:3, 19G5, the plaintiff had prior pains which were 
<·om;istrnt with his admitted pre-existing conditions. 
'l1 wo, that from the record it appeared clear that there 
was no relationship between the infarction and his work 
activities. Based upon these findings and opinions, the 
medical panel concluded that the applicant's present dis-
ability due to heart disease cannot be considered to be 
of industrial origin. 
The plaintiff relies upon the fact that the panel 
c·onsidered th<' applicant's work activities in arriving at 
the muse for his disability. The medical panel, in stating 
that "the aetnal work ht> was doing was no different 
that he> had lwen arcustomed to for a number of years," 
'''Hs simpl~, rorrohorating their finding that the appli-
ennt 's difficultie:s were not aggravated by his working 
eondition:s, but rather that his disability was due to a 
natnrn l Pvolntion of a degenerative condition and that 
the panel eould find no definite occurrence traceable to 
11 particular incident. 
As stated above, no place in the record did either 
tlw medieal panel members or the Industrial Commission 
hasl' tlwir eonclusion on the fact that the plaintiff failed 
to show unusual exertion. 
Plaintiff has eited and relies upon the Utah case of 
f'111it.11 IJisrnit Cmnz)((ny, et al, v. The lndustri.al Com-
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m1ss1011, et al, (19+9) 115 Utah 1, :201 P~d 9()]. 'l'l1(· 
dPfendants do not disagTl'e with thP holding of this ca::;(: 
and further agn~e that it is not rn•cessary to :,;how un-
usual exertion in thes(~ ca~ws, hut that all that is nec\~::i­
sary is a showing that the work activiti('s pn·eipitated 
the resulting disability or injury. The Pmity Biscuit 
case, however, is clearly distinguishable from tliis ca::;e. 
'l'he most ohvious distinction was the i::;sue prest:•nted to 
the Supreme Court in that easP. The Industrial Com-
mission ruled in the applicant's favor and th<> issue 
1n·esented therefor, ~was whetht>r or not its Order was 
arbitrary and capricious and should be overturned. In 
this case, the Industrial Commission denied the appli-
cant's claim. 
Secondly, m the Purity Biscuit case, the medical 
evidence showed that the work activities of the applicant 
were directly related to the resulting disability. Such 
evidence was clear. The issue presented was the faet 
that there was no unusual activity and therefore, it wa1< 
argued, as a matter of law, that the award should have 
been reversed. In making its ruling, the Court held that 
an unexpected internal failure precipitated by work ac-
tivities was sufficient to fall within the definition of acci-
dent, as contained in Section 35-1-GO, PCA 1953 as 
amended. The Purity Biscuit case cannot be read nor 
interpreted to mean that the requirements of an accirlrnt 
is not the test of whether or not compensation should he 
received. In other words, it is clear that to allow compen-
sation for all complaints, without a requirement of an 
accident occurring, would violate the legislative purpose 
of the Workmen's Compensation Act and would, in effect, 
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diangt• the cov(•rage from aeeidental henefits to a health 
and welfan· polie.v insurance. In this case the Industrial 
Commission held, in effect, that the applicant failed to 
prove an accident. Since an early Utah case, Tavey 
v. Industrial Commission, 106 Utah 489, 150 P2d 379, 
the Utah Court has held accident to mean an unforeseen 
happening or unex1wcted mishap, that is, "an event not 
within one's foresight and expectation resulting in a 
mishap causing injury." In a recent Utah case, Cnrling 
v. Industrial Commission, 16 Utah 2d 260, 399 P2d 202, 
a similar issue to that present in this case was presented 
to this Court, that is, whdher or not the Industrial 
Commission erred in finding that the applicant's dis-
ability was clue from a gradual deterioration or rather 
a single incident in conm~ction with his work. The Court 
discusses the nPed for the requirement of an accident 
as follows : 
(1, 2) The ~Workmen's Compensation Act, 
Section :15-1--1-5, UCA 1953, as amended, provides 
for an award to an employee"* * ~·who is injured 
* '1' '/.' hy acci.dcnt arising out of or in the course 
of his employment * * * ." There is no further 
definition of the term "accident," but this court 
has held that for the purpose of the Act it should 
be given a broad meaning. It connotes an un-
anticipated, unintended occurrence different from 
what would normally be expected to occur in the 
usual course of events. We recognize the cor-
rectness of plaintiff's contention that even though 
there must be some such "accident" within the 
meaning of that statute, this is not necessarily 
r<>stricted to some single incident which happened 
suddenly at one particular time and does not 
preclude the possibility that due to exertion, 
str<»ss or other repetitive cause, a climax might 
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lil' rPaeht•d in such manner as to prn1wrl,Y fall 
\\-ithin tho dPfinition of an accident as just nhove.' 
Ho\H'Vl'l" sneh an oeemTencP must lw distin-
guished from graduall~- developing conditions 
which are classified as oc·enpational disemws and 
which are not compensahh~ l'xcept as provickd in 
Cha pt Pr 2 of Tit le :35 (Sections ~35-2-l, et seq.), 
rcA 1953." 
It is clear in this record and, in fact, undisputed that thP 
applicant had a SPVPrt' pre-existing condition. On page 
68 of the record the evidence clearly shows the type of 
developing disease thP applicant was suffering from: 
MR. MOORE: Q. "Now, Doctor, when a pt•r-
son has the tnie of hPart disease that the appli-
cant has in this case, you mentioned once that 
there is a predestination that thPl'l' will be an 
occurronce. "What did you mean by that 0? 
A. That is the nature of arteriosclerotie 
!wart di:wase. It's a slowl:v dPveloping proces::;, 
and s011w rwovh' an· subject to it and others IHI' 
not ( 
Q. Now assuming that you have this disease, 
are you liable or more likely to have an infarction~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And may this infarction be brought about 
by activities not conneeted \\-ith work 0! 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Can it be brought about by normal living 
activities~ 
A. True. 
Q. And can this lw brought ahout "·lien n 
lH'l'SOn PVPn he l't'Sting? 
A. Right. 
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Q. And it could he brought about when he 
1s in his :,;leep? 
A. Corn~ct. 
Q. And it's common that this occurs? 
A. In the general population it is. 
Q. And it's common that it occurs in the 
t;·pe of ::;ituation of the age and condition of the 
Applicant in this case? 
A. That is true. 
Q. Then in your opinion was this heart con-
dition brought on bPcause of the peculiarity of 
his workJ 
A. '11 he Panel considered that, and he was 
quite explanatory in our discussion with him 
about the worries connected with the job, and the 
difficulties in getting jobs finished, which we 
considered to be more-or-less par for the course 
in this kind of work. That he was an owner-con-
tractor, and that would to be considered part of 
the job. 
Q. Now as a practical matter, he had a 
similar attack about a week earlier 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And isn't it more likely that once you 
hav(' an attack, that a second one will come quicker 
than if you wouldn't have had the first one? 
A. \Vell, 1 can't answer that. That is true, 
hut ·we are not certain exactly when he had the 
coronary thrombosis, or ·when he had the infarc-
tion. He might have had it several days before 
this incident. 
Q. But he described an incident, which ap-
1wared to describe this sort of a condition, a week 
earlier? 
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A. \Vell, apparently it \\·as an atta<:'k of at 
lt•ast angina 1wctoris. It \ms t~·pieall;· descrip-
tive. \VIwtlwr or not he had his actual thrombosis 
then, we are not able to say that. 'l'll(_' only thing 
we can sa;· is that the first examination he had, 
and tlw first t>lectrocardiograrn, demonstrated a 
\\·ell-(•stahlished infarction already present. 
Q. And when hP had this otlwr attack is 
when lH~ was at home'? 
A. True. He had certainl,\· what is described 
as angina pectoris. 
Q. Yes. Now wlwn you are at hmrn~, sitting 
down and thinking about the pressures of life, 
this could bring on this sort of a situation'! 
A. Surely. '' 
Thus, the record is dear that the ap1llicant's pre-
existing condition was such, that a disabling heart attack 
of the nature that the applicant suffered, could havP 
been brought on by activit,\· outside of his employment 
and fnrtlwr could liavl' been preeipitated hy no krnmn 
activity. The a1>plicant's treating physician agrees ·with 
snch position. (R. 9-1). 
Q. "Now this tnw of eondition develop:' 
over what period of time? 
A. "r ell, I don't think that we can say defi-
nitely. Probably over a lifetimP. 
Q. A lifetime'! 
A. (Nodding lwa(l lll the affirmative.) 
Q. Isn't it connnon, with a person that ha,; 
this condition, that an,\· sort of strain - w01T;· 
or concern, on or off tlw joh - may preeipitatl' 
an infarction 'I 
A. (Nodding head in the affirmativr.) 
12 
(~. ls that correct? 
A. Yes. 
(~. And in fact an infarction can occur with-
out any reeognizable worry or stress, if you have 
this condition; is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. In fact this is common? 
A. Y~~s. 
(~. In many instances people with this con-
dition wakP u11 in the middle of the night with 
an infarction; is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And therefore, if you have this type of 
condition, it's not necessary to precipitate an 
infarction that you have any particular trauma 
or worry; is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now prior to June 23, 1965, the patient 
related to you that he had some chest pain; is 
that eorrect? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And did he tell you for how long preced-
ing the 23rd of J nne, 1965, that he had this chest 
pain? 
A. ~f y recollection is that it had been for a 
1wriod of two to three days preceding this. 
Q. And di<l he tell you what precipitated the 
first chest pain'? 
A. I don't recall. 
Q. Now assuming that he had a chest pain 
approximately three to five days prior to the 
:23rd - in the evening time, when he was sleep-
ing - what would you diagnose, or what would 
you state was the cause of that chest pain~ 
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.\. Th(• eansu \1·,ntl(l ]1,. insnffi('i(•nt o\:,\·µ:('ll 
to tlw lll.'·oeardinrn. 
Q. And is it possil>le that an infarction could 
havP OCCUITPd at that till!(' r A mild infarrtion: 
A. It's possihlP." 
Tlw deft>ndants feel it appropriatP to state the hold. 
ing of' Thom((S Der· ill rmorial Associatirm, ct al, r. Tlie 
Industrial Commission, ...... Utah ...... , 1:l8 P:2d :2:13, 
wherein thP Court stntPd: 
"\\~p do not intPnd to OJH'n thP doo1· to rt-· 
<·owr.'· for all in,jm;\'S of this t,\-]H' (s1waking 
ahout heart attaek vasPs) 111PrelY because th<'Y 
o(·r·m· on tlw premisPs of the empl~yPr during t!t.e 
h01ns of tlw Pmplo.'·11wnt. In such case tlw Com· 
mission would be warranted in n·quiring rlear and 
convinring proof that the claim<>d injury resulterl 
ht>cuusP of tllP extra \\·ork or over-rxertion, mer<>l.1· 
showing a possibilit.'· of such a causr and effect 
will not suffice.'' 
'l'lw plaintiff state's in his hril'f that tlH· cast- of 
.low's et al ... L California Packing Corvoration (1952) 
1:21 Ptah Gl'.2. :2-~+ P:2d G-t.O. is clNH authority for a I'P· 
versal in this matter. Tlw clef endants disagT('<'. In thl' 
Jones case the state of thP medical testimony was far 
different than it was in this <'ase. ln that casP hrn (2) 
doctors kstified on behalf of tlw applicant that tht· 
occlusion n':'mltPd from tlH· \rnrk activities. 1'ht> on!~· 
<>vidPnr0 to n~but this tlwor~· was a doctor that tpstifirrl 
that it is i>ossibly relatPd hut that lw could not form an 
opinion. AR sueh, of cmusP, the ch•nial \Ya~ not allO\n•(I 
to stand. In this particular easp th<' parn·l found tltnt 
th<> canst> of tlw disability wa:-: th<' pn•-existing disP11~1· 
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and not the work activities. They found further that the 
work activities did not aggravate or precipitate the heart 
attack. rrhe statement of Dr. Kilpatrick's that the work 
a('tivitic~:o "could have" caused the disability is taken out 
of l'Onkxt and tlw tnw effect of his testimony shows 
that there is silllply a dispute between medical doctors. 
Therefore, the Commission's Order which adopted one 
position certainly cannot be considered arbitrary and 
enpriciou:-;. 8ee Burton 1·. The luclustrial Commission, 
1:3 l'tah :2d 353, 37-! P2d -1:39 . 
.Much to do is made of the fact that Mr. Mellen testi-
fied that he did not have an attack at home in the evening 
prior to June 23, 1965. The panel, of course, obtained 
this information from the applicant himself. N otwith-
starnling this fact, after .Mr. Mellen had testified, Dr. 
Kilpatrick stated that sueh testimony did not vary his 
( ondusions. lt is reRpPctfully suggested that Jones v. 
Culiforniu Packing Corporation, sitpra, is not in point 
and the Commission's Ordt>r :;;hould be sustained. 
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CON CL PS I():.,' 
The Conm1ission's Ordrr lwn•in shonkl lw sm.;tain<>d 
for the following reasons: 
l. That the plaintiff failt-d to sustain his burdt-n 111 
showing that an accidt-nt had occmTed. 
2. That the Commission did not hold that the appli-
cant need prove unusual exertion. 
3. 'l1hat tlw Commission's action m believing tlH· 
medical panel as oppost-d to lwlieving the applicant'~ 
treating physician is not arhitrar~- and eapricious. 
Resp(•ctfully submitted, 
ROBERT D. ~fOORE 
-t22 Contirn•ntal Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Defrndrmfs. 
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